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MAnAgeMenT WhIPsAWIng: The sTAgIng Of 
LAbOR COMPeTITIOn UnDeR gLObALIzATIOn
IAn gReeR AnD MARCO hAUPTMeIeR*
The authors examine management whipsawing practices in the 
european auto industry based on more than 200 interviews and a 
comparison of three automakers. They identify four distinct ways in 
which managers stage competition between plants to extract labor 
concessions: informal, hegemonic, coercive, and rule-based 
whipsawing. Practices at the three auto firms differed from one 
another and changed over time because of two factors: structural 
whipsawing capacity and management labor relations strategy. In the 
context of economic globalization, whipsawing is an effective means 
for managers to extract concessions, to loosen national institutional 
constraints, and to diffuse employment practices internationally.
since the 1970s, production and exchange have increasingly taken place on a global scale, facilitated by market liberalization and foreign direct 
investment by multinational corporations (MnCs). Many studies have 
shown that economic globalization has reshaped collective bargaining by 
intensifying market pressures on firms and workers (Tilly 1995) and that 
management practices in MnCs have translated these pressures into changes 
*Ian greer is a Professor at the University of greenwich and a senior Research Associate at Cornell’s 
school of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR). Marco hauptmeier is a Reader in Comparative employ-
ment Relations at Cardiff business school, Cardiff University. for comments we are grateful to Magda-
lena bernaciak, edmund heery, nick Krachler, Oliver nachtwey, Ozlem Onaran, Thomas Prosser, and 
Matt Vidal and the participants of the International Labor Process Conference in Leeds (April 5–7, 
2011), the Workshop on Politics and Power in MnCs at Cardiff business school (April 15, 2011), the 
human Resource Management (hRM) seminar at the University of groningen (April 21, 2011), the 
society for the Advancement of socio-economics (sAse) Conference in Madrid (June 23–25, 2011), 
the Work after fordism Workshop at Queen Mary University (september 12–13, 2011), the Transna-
tional Industrial Relations Workshop at the University of greenwich (May 31–June 1, 2012), the 16th 
International Labour and employment Relations Association (ILeRA) World Congress in Philadelphia 
(July 2–5, 2012), the Management seminar at the University of bristol (March 5, 2013), the european 
Trade Union Institute (eTUI) Workshop on social Dumping in europe in Amsterdam (June 19, 2013), 
the employment Research Unit (eRU) Conference at Cardiff business school (september 9–10, 2013), 
and the german Industrial Relations Association (gIRA) Conference in erlangen (October 10–11, 
2013). We thank Cornell University’s einaudi Center, Cornell University’s ILR school, the hans böckler 
foundation, and Cardiff business school for funding portions of the field research. Correspondence can 
be directed to the authors at hauptmeierm@cardiff.ac.uk.
602254ILRXXX10.1177/0019793915602254ILR ReviewManagement Whipsawing
research-article2015
Keywords: whipsawing, labor competition, labor relations, auto industry, multinational corporations, 
management strategy, globalization, european Works Councils, labor unions
30 ILR ReVIeW
in firm-level employment relations (e.g., Katz 1985; Mueller and Purcell 
1992; Moody 1997; Raess 2014). Less is known, however, about the role of 
management in organizing international competition.
In this article we discuss whipsawing as a technique for managers to extract 
labor concessions using between-plant competition. Whipsawing is usually 
understood as a negotiation practice in which one negotiator plays off at 
least two other parties against each other to gain an advantage (graham, 
evenko, and Rajan 1992). Whereas previous employment relations literature 
referred to whipsawing in situations in which two plants engaged in a direct 
contest over production (Turner 1991; Katz 1993), we use the term whipsaw-
ing in a wider sense. We examine whipsawing as a way in which managers 
stage market competition (brinkmann 2011) across the corporate network 
in the context of production and investment decisions. The various forms of 
management whipsawing deserve attention in employment relations research 
because they help managers reduce the constraining effects of national insti-
tutions and diffuse employment relations practices internationally.
We examine MnCs in the european auto industry from the emergence of 
widespread management whipsawing in the mid-1980s up to the economic 
crisis in 2008. We focus on europe because it is a world region where some 
of the most sophisticated whipsawing practices have developed. We exam-
ine the U.s. companies general Motors (gM) and ford, which developed 
whipsawing techniques in the United states (Katz 1985; Moody 1997) and 
then introduced them in europe (Mueller and Purcell 1992; fetzer 2012). 
We also examine the german MnC Volkswagen (VW), the largest auto-
maker in europe, in which management behavior differs because of within-
firm institutions conducive to labor-management partnership (Turner 1991; 
greer and hauptmeier 2008) but in which, nonetheless, we observe whip-
sawing.
This article’s first contribution is to distinguish among four whipsawing 
patterns. Informal whipsawing is the staging of competition using labor’s 
understanding that concessions are necessary for investment but without 
using explicit or specific threats. Coercive whipsawing is the use of explicit or 
specific threats, with a narrow focus on extracting concessions and little 
attempt to secure the cooperation of worker representatives. In the other 
two patterns, managers also organize competition but try to maintain a part-
nership with workers by influencing labor’s interests and ideas (hegemonic 
whipsawing) or using standardized formal bidding (rule-based whipsawing).
This article’s second contribution is to identify two factors that explain 
the observed emergence of, and variation in, whipsawing practices. first, 
the production structures of MnCs and market conditions provide manage-
ment with varying and changing degrees of whipsawing capacity. The over-
all increase in flexibility to reallocate production to different plants allows 
whipsawing to emerge and develop. second, within these constraints, man-
agement pursues diverse labor relations strategies. Competition is organized 
in varying ways in response to the simultaneous and conflicting needs to 
both secure partnership with and force concessions from organized labor.
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The Changing Conditions and Practices of Whipsawing
In industrial relations, the term whipsawing originally referred to union 
rather than management behavior. It has been defined as “a bargaining tac-
tic used by trade unions in which there is an attempt to spread wage and 
other concessions from one employer to another. . . . A breakthrough in 
negotiations in a lead firm (could) thereby be generalized across an indus-
try or occupational group” (heery and noon 2008: 510).
Labor unions used whipsawing historically to establish pattern bargaining. 
based on the U.s. experience of the 1930s and 1940s, Ross (1948: 53–70) 
pointed to equalizing tendencies under collective bargaining, driven by vari-
ous “orbits of coercive comparisons,” such as labor and product markets. In 
the post–World War II decades, union whipsawing took place regularly across 
the developed world as unions ratcheted up wages in a context of strong eco-
nomic growth (Markovits 1986; Marginson 1988). Auto manufacturing was an 
important site of union whipsawing. In post–new Deal United states and 
postwar United Kingdom, unions would target a particular company and then 
demand that other companies pay according to the new pattern. In the 
United states, the union had the advantage that, during a long strike at one 
company, workers at the other companies would continue paying into the 
strike fund; deviation among companies (and within companies) was minor 
(Katz 1985). similarly, in the United Kingdom, ford workers established a 
“parity campaign” to bring wages up to the level of british Leyland; subse-
quently, ford was seen by unions as the company that set standards for the 
sector (beynon 1973). In postwar germany, where formal sectoral bargaining 
encompassed the entire metal sector, Ig Metall would first seek agreement in 
its baden-Württemberg district because of the highly organized workforce 
there. This agreement would then be extended to other metalworking regions 
and would also influence bargaining in other sectors (Markovits 1986).
employers also engaged in comparisons among plants as early as the 
1970s. for example, ford conducted performance comparisons of its euro-
pean plants (beynon 1973), pointing to the productivity gap between brit-
ish and continental european plants and criticizing the regular strikes and 
wildcat disputes in the United Kingdom (fetzer 2009: 16). Management’s 
comparisons did not have a strong effect on employment relations, how-
ever, because they took place in a context of growth in demand, high utiliza-
tion of in-plant capacity, and international trade barriers. Little scope for 
relocating production existed. As recently as 1976, even in the United states, 
“union whipsawing [was] much more prevalent than the reverse phenome-
non” (hendricks 1976: 78).
With economic globalization, the union strike threat lost its potency as 
managers gained credible exit options and increased their capacity to whip-
saw (Anner et al. 2006; Raess 2014). governments gradually opened product 
markets to international producers. Internationalization had a strong regional 
dimension, especially in the european Union, which promoted a wide range 
of market-making institutional changes over several decades, including the 
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free flow of goods, services, labor, and capital (Lillie 2010; höpner and 
schäfer 2010). The internationalization of markets made trading across bor-
ders and investing outside of their home countries easier for MnCs.
Changing market conditions also put pressures on firms. With slowing 
economic growth after the 1970s and increasing international competition, 
markets for automobiles became saturated (bonin, Lung, and Tolliday 
2003). by the 1990s, excessive production capacity became a serious prob-
lem, as underutilized plants squeezed profits or triggered losses, putting 
jobs at risk. for trade unionists, the trade-off between jobs and pay became 
acute, making them more sensitive to production assignments and invest-
ments, and therefore susceptible to demands for concessions.
Parallel to the internationalization of markets, globalization altered MnC 
organization, structure, and strategy (Morgan, Kristensen, and Whitley 
2001). facing increased market competition, the two main objectives for 
MnCs in the auto industry became cost reduction and increased product 
variety (bordenave and Lung 1996). foreign direct investments by MnCs 
accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, and MnC operations became integrated 
across borders. global manufacturing systems stipulated work organization 
and production norms in plants around the world (Williams and geppert 
2012). Management gradually developed transnational production net-
works and production platforms with standardized production templates in 
multiple plants in different countries. Different models on a platform 
shared a majority of parts, driving down the cost of parts, but differed in 
terms of outside appearance (Jürgens 1998). some corporate strategies, 
such as parts purchase and manufacturing systems, unfolded on a global 
level, whereas production platforms were embedded in world regions 
(freyssenet and Lung 2000).
The evolving internationalization of production facilitated management 
whipsawing. In one early incident in the United states, management threat-
ened to purchase new axles from another plant unless the local union 
agreed to concessions. The unions, under pressure to retain local jobs, 
agreed to work-rule changes, including the broadening of job classifications 
(Katz 1985: 66–68). In the second half of the 1980s, whipsawing became 
widespread at U.s. assembly plants. Turner (1991) documented within-
country whipsawing to force work-rule changes on local unions to promote 
lean production. Plants that did not cooperate were passed over in invest-
ment decisions, threatened with closure, or closed down. Although this did 
not initially break the wage pattern, it did decentralize collective bargaining 
over work rules (Katz 1993).
Management also began to whipsaw plants across borders (Moody 1997). 
babson (2000) observed dual sourcing at ford plants in the United states 
and Mexico, in which labor concessions were extracted by playing plants 
from both sides of the border off against each other. ford and gM also 
experimented more widely and forcefully with whipsawing practices in 
europe, in the 1980s by pitting german and british car-parts plants against 
each other (Mueller and Purcell 1992) and later by employing this strategy 
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throughout their european corporate networks (hancké 2000; fetzer 
2012). from the 1990s, other european auto MnCs followed suit (Meardi 
2000; greer and hauptmeier 2008; bernaciak 2010).
The industrial relations literature has identified a number of manage-
ment practices associated with whipsawing. first, managers engage in bench-
marking, the systematic measurement and comparison of processes and 
performance across plants (sisson, Arrowsmith, and Marginson 2003). This 
can be merely an exercise in data gathering, but it can also have a more nor-
mative or coercive meaning when combined with other whipsawing prac-
tices. second, managers organize competition among plants by pitting them 
against each other in the context of production assignments (Mueller and 
Purcell 1992) and demanding labor concessions in exchange for invest-
ment. Third, managers stage this competition in different ways. In some 
cases, managers articulate an explicit and specific threat to shift production if 
labor does not agree to concessions (babson 2000; Raess 2006; Raess and 
burgoon 2006); in other instances, managers do not state this threat openly 
(Coller 1996). fourth, managers introduce formal bidding for new produc-
tion with clear rules and expectations about the competitive assignment of 
investment and production (greer and hauptmeier 2008). Plants with a 
better tender, often including higher labor concessions, win the contest. 
fifth, corporate leaders seek to legitimize their actions by influencing workers’ 
ideas (ferner and edwards 1995; hauptmeier 2012; hauptmeier and heery 
2014). for example, managers try to convince workers that the competitive 
assignment of production is necessary for survival in the highly competitive 
auto markets. We use these five whipsawing practices to distinguish among 
the four whipsawing patterns (Table 1).
Mapping Variation and Change in Whipsawing Patterns
Whipsawing is one way in which managers stage markets and use the result-
ing competition as a tool for coordination and control (brinkmann 2011; 
Vidal 2013). Managers engaging in whipsawing are not just responding to 
the pressures of markets; they are also organizing market competition 
through their investment and production decisions with an aim of extract-
ing labor concessions. The emergence and variation in whipsawing that we 
observe is a function of both whipsawing capacities and management’s labor 
relations strategies.
Table 1. Patterns of Whipsawing
Associated practice Informal Coercive Rule-based Hegemonic
benchmarking Yes Yes Yes Yes
Organizing competition between plants Yes/no Yes Yes Yes
explicit and specific threat to shift production no Yes Yes Yes
formal bidding no no Yes Yes/no
Influencing ideas no no no Yes
34 ILR ReVIeW
Whipsawing capacity refers to the potential and ease with which MnCs 
move production between plants (see Table 2). Parallel and standardized 
production increases the speed and reduces the cost of reallocating produc-
tion at the end of production cycles. Production platforms further increase 
the flexibility to assign production and allow managers to shift production 
at short notice at any time during the product cycle. Production can be 
more easily reallocated between plants when plant utilization is low. Compa-
nies tend to experience low plant utilization and a corresponding profit 
squeeze or loss when market demand deteriorates and excess supply 
increases. This increases the pressures and opportunities for whipsawing 
and reinforces management’s arguments for concessions.
Within these constraints, whipsawing practice is shaped by management’s 
labor relations strategy, which we conceptualize as a balancing act between 
forcing and partnership (Walton, Cutcher-gershenfeld, and McKersie 
2000). forcing is the use of the unilateral managerial prerogative to extract 
concessions, and it is always present to some degree because of needs for 
reduced costs and increased productivity. Partnership is also always present 
to some extent because of the need to secure worker consent, improve qual-
ity, and maintain stability. These two requirements are often in conflict with 
one another; for example, forcing can undermine the labor-management 
partnership. but they can also complement each other; for example, under 
productivity coalitions (Windolf 1989), the local labor-management part-
nership can facilitate concessions in the face of european-level manage-
ment forcing strategies. We differentiate among four degrees of these two 
requirements in our sample: emphasis on forcing (management uses its 
power boldly to extract concessions), emphasis on partnership (manage-
ment focuses on gaining productivity gains through collaboration with 
labor), simultaneous forcing and partnership (management strikes a bal-
ance between the two approaches), and strong partnership (management 
integrates labor into decision-making processes).1 The varying management 
strategies and whipsawing capacities result in four whipsawing patterns: 
informal, coercive, rule-based, and hegemonic.
Table 2. Determinants of Whipsawing Capacity
Whipsawing 
capacity
Parallel 
production Standardization
Production 
platform Market demand Market supply
Plant 
utilization
high Yes high Yes Low to 
medium
high excess 
supply
Underutilized
Medium Yes Low to high no Low to 
medium
some excess 
supply
some spare 
capacity
Low no Low no high Market 
clearance
full-capacity 
utilization
 1A fifth possibility is strong forcing (management ramps up its whipsawing activities by breaking the 
union in one or more locations). Although union busting is well documented internationally, we did not 
observe such strong forcing in our whipsawing cases.
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In informal whipsawing, management does not explicitly threaten labor 
with the withdrawal or withholding of production (Coller 1996). Manage-
ment might, however, still communicate to labor in an informal manner that 
production allocations are coming up in the company. because production 
may go to another plant, these discussions trigger labor concerns, especially 
in the context of excess capacity and underutilized plants. subsequent nego-
tiations between management and labor result in an exchange of labor con-
cessions for production. Managers have an emphasis on partnership and 
avoid undermining existing labor-management collaborations. Managers 
may, in fact, lack the intention or capacity to move production elsewhere—
and we observe informal whipsawing most commonly under medium whip-
sawing capacity—but worker representatives find assessing this to be difficult, 
even with statutory rights to access corporate information.
Coercive whipsawing, by contrast, is explicit and specific. no doubt remains 
about the intentions of management or its capacity to follow through on its 
disinvestment threats. Management sets different plants in competition with 
each other, threatening the affected workforces with the assignment of car 
production to another plant if labor does not agree to sufficient conces-
sions. In some instances, management negotiates only one round of conces-
sions at each plant and subsequently assigns production; in others, 
management uses concessions gained at one plant to extract increasing 
concessions at other plants. This is the back and forth among plants sug-
gested by the literal meaning of whipsawing. The correspondence between 
the extent of labor concessions and production assignments is often unclear. 
because management’s prerogative is exercised blatantly and unilaterally, 
coercive whipsawing has the greatest potential to undermine the labor- 
management partnership.
Rule-based whipsawing is a standardized competitive procedure for the allo-
cation of production and requires a high whipsawing capacity. by introduc-
ing rules and seeking to organize the process in a fair and transparent 
manner, managers try to avoid the potential negative effects of coercive 
whipsawing and maintain labor-management cooperation, but simultane-
ously they try to extract concessions. before the production of a new car 
model begins, management initiates a formal bidding process among the 
plants of a given production platform. each plant submits a tender, and the 
one with the highest labor concessions receives the highest share of the work 
or the exclusive production of the model. In effect, management creates a 
within-company market for the allocation of production (hauptmeier 2011).
Hegemonic whipsawing only occurs when labor is extensively integrated into 
management decision-making processes. giving labor real responsibility in 
governing the company tends to produce a responsible labor ideology, which 
facilitates management’s attempts to convince labor that internal competition 
is necessary for the company to survive in the context of cut-throat, price-
based product competition. Management also argues that the competitive 
assignment of production will help to secure jobs and production assignments 
from headquarters. Thus, management influences worker representatives’ 
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ideas to win their acceptance of the competitive assignment of new produc-
tion. This allows the extraction of labor concessions using explicit exit threats 
without undercutting management’s legitimacy in the workplace.
At least a medium level of whipsawing capacity must be present for whip-
sawing of any kind to be used, and only under high capacity do we see the 
sophisticated rule-based and hegemonic forms of whipsawing. At any par-
ticular level of whipsawing capacity, however, managers organize whipsaw-
ing in varying ways, depending on the mix of partnership and forcing found 
in their labor relations strategies.
Methods and Data
We examine the european auto industry because whipsawing practices have 
become common and varied in this industry. We use qualitative data on the 
european operations of ford, gM, and VW. Data collection took place 
between 2002 and 2010 and included more than 200 interviews. We inter-
viewed auto managers at european and global headquarters and at the local 
plant level in the United states, germany, and spain. We triangulated these 
data on management by interviewing actors with a distinct perspective, such 
as local works councilors, labor representatives, dissidents (activists outside 
the formal labor-representation bodies), industry experts, and european 
works councilors (eWC) from the United Kingdom, belgium, Poland, swe-
den, Russia, germany, and spain. because the recollection of interviewees 
of historical events can be incomplete or biased, we also relied on archival 
data such as corporate newsletters, press releases, magazines, and the leaflet 
archives of labor unions, which helped to reconstruct what the actors 
thought and were motivated by at the time. further information was gath-
ered from webpages and newspapers. The company case studies cover the 
period from the mid-1980s to the 2008 economic crisis, allowing us to assess 
sequences of whipsawing episodes and, therefore, change over time. The 
episodes focus on assembly production but also include activities at parts 
plants when they shed light on the development of whipsawing practices in 
the firm as a whole. In each case, we explore the different patterns of whip-
sawing practices and corresponding explanatory factors. We subsequently 
developed and consolidated the emerging whipsawing categories and 
explanatory factors from the data in relation to previous literature on labor 
competition, corporate strategies, and MnCs.
Ford
At ford, following incidents of coercive whipsawing in the 1980s, informal 
whipsawing became the dominant pattern. Management usually refrained 
from coercive whipsawing practices, with the aims of avoiding conflict with 
labor and nurturing cooperation. Management made labor aware of upcom-
ing production decisions in europe, and trade unionists initiated negotia-
tions over production allocation, which then led to labor concessions. 
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Management turned to coercive whipsawing only when it faced local indus-
trial action in spain, but subsequently it returned to a more informal 
approach with the aim to maintain collaborative employment relations, 
which it regarded as a precondition for producing high-quality cars.
ford was one of the first MnCs to develop an integrated european opera-
tion. ford of europe was founded in 1967 with its headquarters in Warley, 
essex (United Kingdom). henceforth, the european headquarters oversaw 
the two primary, previously independent subsidiaries in germany and the 
United Kingdom. ford germany had its main production sites in Cologne 
and had a plant in genk (belgium) as part of the german operation. The 
ford UK assembly plants were located in halewood, Dagenham, and south-
ampton. In addition, ford owned an assembly plant in Azambuja (Portu-
gal). ford’s european headquarters orchestrated the expansion of 
production in europe in the 1970s by building assembly plants in saarlouis 
(germany) and Valencia (spain) (fetzer 2012).
In the 1980s, ford experimented more widely with whipsawing practices 
in the context of excess production capacities in europe (bonin et al. 2003: 
94). In 1985, ford cited high labor costs in germany as an important factor 
in a possible relocation of engine production to the United Kingdom. ger-
man works councilors averted disinvestment only by negotiating a cost-
reduction agreement with local management (fetzer 2009: 19).
In the late 1980s, management put the Dagenham plant on notice, pre-
senting productivity comparisons that showed the plant to be lagging behind 
its european competitors. Assembling a fiesta in Dagenham took 59 hours, 
compared to 33 hours in Cologne and 35 hours in Valencia. In addition, 
producing a sierra in Dagenham required 67 hours, compared to 40 hours 
in genk (bonin et al. 2003: 101). As a consequence, ford concentrated 
sierra production in genk, and management warned the Dagenham unions 
that the successor model, the Mondeo, would be also sourced to the genk 
plant if labor conflict and productivity did not improve. Parallel production 
in different plants made such coercive whipsawing practices possible.
ford’s whipsawing capacity increased in europe during the 1990s, when 
it expanded production by creating an assembly joint venture with VW in 
setubal (Portugal) and by opening assembly plants in Plonsk (Poland) and 
Obchuk (belarus). The Valencia factory became the flex plant capable of 
producing all ford car models and, thus, could easily take on additional 
production when market conditions required (union interview, spain, April 
26, 2006). The standardization and integration of production were advanced 
through the development of production platforms (implemented in the 
second half of the 1990s), which further increased management’s flexibility 
in reassigning production.
Despite this capacity, ford relied mostly on informal whipsawing during 
this period. In the context of implementing lean production, management 
valued its partnership with worker representatives and regarded this as an 
important element of running their plants productively (management 
interview, germany, november 16, 2005). ford did not want to endanger 
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the labor-management partnership through excessive forcing strategies. 
Whipsawing began to work in a subtler way. for example, when ford 
germany was hit by the 1993 recession, management sought to negotiate a 
company-level agreement to cope with the crisis and reduce labor costs. 
Management put pressure on the works councils by presenting benchmark-
ing data demonstrating that each car produced was Us$516 cheaper in 
Valencia, but it did not explicitly threaten to shift production elsewhere 
(ford Works Council 1993).
Wilfried Kuckelkorn, the head of the german works council, was the one 
who demanded production assignments for the german plants in return for 
concessions. he realized that, in an increasingly tight product market, only 
sufficient production assignments would secure jobs and previous labor gains. 
The resulting Investment security Agreement stipulated production assign-
ments for the german plants until 2000 and an annual labor-cost reduction of 
DM140 million (works council interview, germany, June 24, 2005).
similar negotiations took place in 1997. german works councilors were 
made aware by management that new production assignments were immi-
nent. In a meeting with the worldwide chief executive officer (CeO) of 
ford, Kuckelkorn demanded production assignments and signaled that he 
would be willing to negotiate labor concessions. This initial conversation 
triggered negotiations at ford germany that resulted in another agreement 
that traded labor concessions for production assignments in germany until 
2002 (ford 1997). This agreement had severe consequences for the british 
unions during the next downtown of the market, at the end of the 1990s. 
ford was under pressure to reduce production capacity. because produc-
tion was already promised to german plants, ford decided to shut down car 
production at Dagenham, which meant discontinuing blue-oval car produc-
tion in the United Kingdom after more than 80 years.
At the Valencia plant in spain, whipsawing practices began to matter for 
employment relations only in the late 1990s. Whipsawing arrived relatively 
late because the Valencia plant was one of the most productive assembly 
plants in europe and had operated in the growing spanish auto market. 
Then, management became concerned with growing labor costs, which led 
to a bitter 11-month collective bargaining conflict in 1998. Management 
responded to union strike pressure by threatening to transfer focus produc-
tion from Valencia to saarlouis (Artiles 2002a). The german works council-
ors, however, refused the extra work that would break the strike in spain. In 
subsequent negotiations, ford headquarters in Detroit became directly 
involved in the conflict through a videoconference. The CeO urged the 
spanish unions to agree to the suggested changes and called the trade 
unionists “pirates.” he threatened to close the Valencia plant, not right away 
but gradually through the assignment of new production elsewhere (haupt-
meier 2012).
shortly thereafter, management and labor agreed on a compromise. 
After reflecting on the negotiation process, management decided that all 
future production assignments would take place only following a collective 
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bargaining round, not before collective bargaining, as had happened in 
1998. Management’s view was that doing this would increase pressure on 
labor to find a reasonable compromise in negotiations (management inter-
view, spain, May 15, 2006).
At the end of the 1990s, ford europe’s economic problems intensified. 
ford had significant losses in 1999, in part because of overcapacity, and 
launched an unprecedented retrenchment program in europe with the aim 
of saving $1 billion dollars annually and matching production capacity with 
sales (Automotive Intelligence News 2000). In addition to the termination of 
car production at Dagenham, ford sold its Azambuja (Portugal) plant to 
gM, closed the Plonsk (Poland) plant, sold its share of a joint venture in 
setubal (Portugal), and stopped car production in Obchuk (belarus). but 
ford also opened new assembly plants in st. Petersburg (Russia) and Kocaeli 
(Turkey). The outcome was a significantly changed manufacturing foot-
print, with car production now concentrated in fewer locations.
In the 2000s, the primary competition for new-car production took place 
among the german, belgian, and spanish plants. for example, in 2006, the 
german works council worked to secure long-term production guarantees 
and investments by offering far-reaching concessions, including the intro-
duction of a lower-tier collective bargaining agreement and a wage cut to 
the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement. In return, the 
Cologne and saarlouis plants secured production assignments until 2011 
(ford Works Council 2006).
Concerned that these production assignments would make their jobs vul-
nerable, spanish unions forcefully demanded production assignments. 
Labor representatives from the Valencia plants traveled twice to the euro-
pean headquarters in Cologne and demanded production assignments 
from the CeO of ford europe (union interview, spain, April 27, 2006). Ini-
tially management was reluctant because of the difficulties of predicting 
future production levels, but it eventually negotiated. because Valencia was 
a flex plant, management agreed to assignments of production levels rather 
than specific products. In return, labor agreed to concessions.
Labor initiated negotiations in both germany and spain with the inten-
tion of exchanging concessions for production assignments in the face of 
saturated product markets and production overcapacity. The pattern of 
informal whipsawing thus remained dominant.
General Motors
At gM, whipsawing practices progressed from informal to coercive whipsaw-
ing and then to formal bidding. Initially, gM management used productiv-
ity comparisons and informal whipsawing to extract concessions. Then, with 
a greater maturity of its production platforms and the expansion of its euro-
pean production network, gM pitted plants directly against each other in 
competition to extract concessions. In response to local-level labor conflicts 
and increasing transnational worker cooperation in the eWC, management 
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sought to increase the legitimacy of whipsawing by introducing a formal bid-
ding process for the allocation of production in 2003.
gM initially owned two independent subsidiaries in europe: the british 
car producer Vauxhall, with assembly in ellesmere Port and Luton, and the 
german car producer Opel, with assembly in Rüsselsheim, bochum, and 
Antwerp (belgium). gM sought to keep the two brand identities distinct by 
maintaining separate product development, design, and engineering 
(fetzer 2012: 54–55).
gM began to integrate and expand its european production in the 1980s. 
It set up a european headquarters in zurich in 1986, and then it opened an 
engine and transmission plant in Vienna, an assembly plant in saragossa, 
and a parts plant in france; extended the assembly plant in Antwerp; and 
bought the swedish car company saab (greer and hauptmeier 2012). Par-
allel production became common, with the Ascona range produced in Rüs-
selsheim, Luton, and Antwerp; Corsa-based models produced in ellesmere 
Port, saragossa and bochum; and engines manufactured in Vienna, 
bochum, and Kaiserslautern (fetzer 2012: 56).
At the end of the 1980s, management began to experiment with whipsaw-
ing and used competition among plants over production as leverage to pur-
sue changes in labor relations and work organization (Mueller and Purcell 
1992: 20). This was informal whipsawing in that no explicit threat was made 
to shift production to another plant. In return for a production allocation, 
the saragossa plant was the first in europe that agreed to round-the-clock 
production; previously, three shifts per day had been regarded as physically 
too demanding. similarly, the components plant in Kaiserslautern agreed to 
extended machine running times and working-time flexibility in return for 
investments. This agreement was a departure from previous employment-
relations practices in germany in that such significant working-time changes 
had previously been determined in sectoral bargaining (ibid.).
gM’s whipsawing capacity increased during the 1990s with the construc-
tion of assembly plants in eisenach (germany) and gliwice (Poland) and an 
engine plant in hungary. As in other parts of the world, gM europe intro-
duced its global manufacturing system, which defined common production 
standards, norms, and practices (Laudon and Laudon 2011); implementa-
tion was audited by a benchmarking team that regularly assessed the prog-
ress of different plants (interview member benchmarking team, United 
states, March 23, 2004). gM standardized further by introducing produc-
tion platforms, which were fully implemented by the late 1990s.
These changes gave management more flexibility to shift production 
between plants, which it increasingly used as an implicit threat to whipsaw 
plants and extract concessions. for example, during the 1993 recession in 
the european auto market, management published benchmarking data in 
the Opel company newsletters showing that the german plants had the 
highest labor costs and lowest annual working time of any gM plant world-
wide (Opel Post 1993), but it did not explicitly threaten labor to shift produc-
tion to another plant. Later, management unilaterally cancelled three 
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collective agreements on social benefits, an unprecedented move at Opel. 
The works council sought to fight off making concessions and pointed to the 
previously solid profits at the german plants. In the context of the recession, 
however, labor was under pressure to trade concessions for an employment-
protection clause that prohibited forced redundancies (Rehder 2003).
In 1995, management pitted the Rüsselsheim, Antwerp, and Luton plants 
against each other in the context of the Vectra allocation. In the negotia-
tions with german works councilors, management pointed again to the 
high labor costs in germany. Labor agreed to a working-time “corridor” that 
allowed the weekly working time to shift between 31 and 38.75 hours, 
depending on market conditions (Opel Works Council 1995), in exchange 
for a share of the Vectra production. After concluding negotiations in ger-
many, gM approached the Antwerp and Luton plants, pointing to the pro-
ductivity improvements in germany. Management made the case to the 
belgian and british unionists that they also had to reduce their costs if they 
wanted a portion of the Vectra production. because both plants urgently 
needed further production, they agreed to make labor concessions in return 
for a share of the Vectra production (works council interview, germany, 
november 1, 2005). Management repeated the same coercive whipsawing 
in 1998. Again, management negotiated concessions at the german plants 
in exchange for production and investments, and then used this agreement 
to extract concessions from the belgian and british plants (interview with 
belgian unionist, eWC meeting, July 4, 2005).
Management’s whipsawing practices led to tensions among the labor rep-
resentatives in gM’s eWC. The british labor representatives felt that the 
german unionists had negotiated behind their back and at the expense of 
the other european plants. Accusations flew within the eWC, but the labor 
representatives also realized that the fierce whipsawing practices by manage-
ment were ultimately responsible for the bouts of bargaining over conces-
sions in europe in the 1990s (Kotthoff 2006). They responded by intensifying 
their transnational work in the eWC (greer and hauptmeier 2012).
The saragossa plant was not initially strongly affected by whipsawing 
because of its production of the Corsa, gM’s best-selling car in europe. As 
the balance sheet of the plant deteriorated at the end of the 1990s, however, 
the saragossa plant needed a second car model to utilize its entire produc-
tion capacity. Management offered Meriva production to the saragossa 
plant in exchange for concessions and productivity improvements; other-
wise, it would assign the new model to the gliwice plant in Poland (haupt-
meier 2012). The ensuing labor-management negotiations traded a 
reduction in labor costs for the assignment of the Meriva model to the sara-
gossa plant.
In 2000, coercive whipsawing practices led to worker protests. The 
bochum plant experienced wildcat strikes to protest feared job losses in the 
context of the fiat-gM joint venture. A conflict that year at the Luton plant 
had wider ramifications. The local strike action of the british unions was 
supported by the eWC, which organized a transnational work stoppage in 
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which 40,000 workers across europe participated (herber and schäfer-Klug 
2002). Management extracted concessions with its forcing and whipsawing 
practices, but doing so also undermined cooperation with labor.
After that, management tried to make whipsawing practices fairer and 
more transparent. In 2003, gM introduced a bidding process for the alloca-
tion of production for plants producing on the same platform. Plants inter-
ested in new production had to submit a bid, which laid out cost savings and 
labor concessions. Management would assess the bids based on labor costs 
and productivity comparisons. The plant that won the tender would receive 
either the entire production of a new car model or a higher share of pro-
duction than competing plants. In effect, management created a within-
company market for the allocation of production.
Management regarded this as a fair and just process, and compared it to 
the many markets that exist in advanced economies that efficiently allocate 
goods and services (management interviews, U.s. headquarters, March 22, 
2004). Although formal bidding was intended to increase the legitimacy of 
whipsawing, worker representatives regarded it as yet another management 
forcing strategy to extract labor concessions (works council interview, ger-
many, May 26, 2005).
In 2004, gM offered the zafira model to the gliwice and Rüsselsheim 
plants in a bidding contest. Although both plants offered concessions, man-
agement argued each car was €350 cheaper to produce in Poland. This was a 
major blow for the german worker representatives because production was at 
only 70% of capacity and the Rüsselsheim plant urgently needed another 
product (works council interview, germany, May 3, 2005). In 2005, manage-
ment whipsawed the saragossa and gliwice plants for the new Meriva model. 
In this case, competitive pressures increased when the bidding process 
became public in saragossa. Management provided the local newspapers with 
the benchmarking data for the two plants. The local public anxiously followed 
the outcome because of the importance of the gM plant for the local econ-
omy. Ultimately, the spanish unions won after agreeing to concessions (UgT 
gM 2005). A further bidding process took place between the Rüsselsheim 
and Trollhättan plants in 2005. Management assessed the total production 
costs as being €200 million cheaper in Rüsselsheim, and the plant received 
the new Vectra (works council interviews, germany, April 18, 2005).
In another round of tendering, gM pitted the Delta platform plants 
against each other. european management asked the plants in ellesmere 
Port, Antwerp, bochum, Trollhätten, and gliwice to submit bids for Astra 
production. The eWC sought to counter this transnational whipsawing 
through intensified transnational worker cooperation and demanded that 
management negotiate jointly a fair and egalitarian distribution of produc-
tion that would allow all plants to survive. supported by the european Metal 
Workers federation, the eWC founded the Delta group, in which worker 
representatives at each plant signed a solidarity pledge stipulating that no 
plant would engage in individual negotiations with management and under-
bid the other plants (bartmann and blum-geenen 2006). Management 
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interpreted the Delta group as a “declaration of war” and gross interfer-
ence with its right to manage (management interview, gM europe head-
quarters, May 29, 2005). The explicit goal of management became to break 
the common labor negotiation bloc, and this was achieved through a secret 
deal with the bochum works council.
Management’s effort to secure legitimacy through rule-based whipsawing 
was not notably successful, although it did succeed in dividing the work-
force, leading to further labor concessions.
Volkswagen
VW was a late adopter of whipsawing and initially used informal whipsawing, 
which evolved into a pattern of hegemonic whipsawing. Management’s 
attempts to convince labor that whipsawing was necessary were successful, 
and labor representatives believed that the competitive assignment of pro-
duction would help the plants to stay productive and defend jobs. VW also, 
however, periodically resorted to coercive whipsawing practices when faced 
with an intransigent local workforce.
VW’s european operations are concentrated in germany, with a head-
quarters in Wolfsburg. VW began expanding in europe in the 1970s by 
building a plant in belgium in 1971 and in Yugoslavia in 1972, by taking 
over the spanish auto company seAT in the 1980s and the Czech company 
Škoda in 1991, and by engaging in a joint venture with ford in Portugal in 
1995. Despite a long tradition of labor-management partnership, labor rep-
resentatives became concerned about the increasing labor competition in 
europe in the late 1980s, which spurred the foundation of one of the first 
eWCs in 1992 and the World Works Council (WWC) in 1999.
Whipsawing at VW emerged only in the 1990s. A recession in the euro-
pean auto market began in 1992, and when the company determined that 
VW was drifting toward crisis, the supervisory board appointed a new CeO, 
ferdinand Piëch, who was given the task to restructure VW. he imple-
mented production platforms from 1993, which cut across the brands 
Škoda, VW, Audi, and seAT (Jürgens 1998; Piëch 2002), and ended produc-
tion at seAT’s assembly plant in barcelona.
In addition, management sought to tackle labor costs. Workers in ger-
many were able to avoid redundancies only by agreeing to far-reaching con-
cessions on working-time reduction and flexibility. As part of the drive to 
reduce labor costs, in 1995 management considered assigning the produc-
tion of a new model, the Lupo, to the VW Pamplona (spain) plant (hai-
peter 2000). Previously, all new VW car models had initially been produced 
in germany and only assigned to foreign plants later in the product cycle. 
To avoid the assignment of the Lupo to a foreign plant, labor in germany 
agreed to labor concessions, among them further working-time flexibility 
measures. given the contentious labor relations at VW’s Pamplona plant, 
however, it is unclear that management had seriously intended to assign the 
car there.
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by the late 1990s, however, the standardization of production and the 
development of platforms gave VW more flexibility to shift car production 
and to assign new car models to different plants. In 1999, management 
assigned the new car model Touareg, a small sports utility vehicle (sUV), to 
the bratislava plant. This showed that they were serious about taking advan-
tage of the lower foreign labor costs and that their foreign plants were up 
to the task of rolling out high-end car models (interview industry expert, 
germany, May 19, 2005).
VW also introduced a bidding process for the sourcing of parts in 1999, 
which pitted internal suppliers against external competitors by allowing 
both to submit tenders. If an external supplier offered to produce a part at 
a lower cost, the internal VW supplier had the chance to make a final bid 
undercutting the external supplier. This process radically reduced the labor 
costs at VW parts plants in germany. The formal bidding process was intro-
duced with the consent of labor. Management collaborated closely with 
works councilors on the supervisory board and actively sought to convince 
labor of its assessment of the auto market (management interview, ger-
many, December 15, 2005). Ultimately, management and labor agreed that 
VW’s plants faced cut-throat competition in the parts sector and that the 
bidding process helped to make the internal suppliers more competitive. 
The labor representatives preferred making concessions over permanent 
outsourcing, which had happened at gM and ford plants and was a realistic 
alternative (works council interviews, germany, July 19, 2007; union inter-
view, germany, June 12, 2007).
In the early 2000s, management approached labor representatives in 
germany about the production of a new model, the Touran. Management 
made clear that this would be assigned to germany only if labor agreed to a 
separate, lower collective bargaining agreement; it proposed what would 
become the “5000 × 5000 project”: 5,000 new jobs at DM5,000 per month 
(about €2,500), roughly 20% below the wage level of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Management sought to frame the project in a positive man-
ner by emphasizing that the new jobs would go to the unemployed and that 
the project served to secure industrial jobs in germany (schumann, Kuhl-
mann, sanders, and sperling 2006).
Initially, worker representatives rejected the proposal because it would 
have broken the collective bargaining pattern at VW for the first time. The 
protracted negotiations between management and labor received consider-
able attention from politicians and the news media. The tabloid press 
depicted Ig Metall as a “job killer.” Throughout the negotiations, manage-
ment suggested that production could go to a foreign plant if labor did not 
agree to concessions. The conflict was resolved only after the german chan-
cellor, gerhard schröder, intervened (management interview, germany, 
December 15, 2005). Under mounting pressure, labor agreed to the “5000 
× 5000 project,” which created a lower-tier collective bargaining agreement 
in exchange for the production allocation to Wolfsburg.
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In 2002, VW management used the increasing flexibility in their euro-
pean production network to whipsaw the seAT plant in Martorell, near bar-
celona (hauptmeier 2012). In contrast to the german plants, which had 
already agreed to far-reaching working-time flexibility during the 1990s, 
spanish unions had fiercely resisted working-time flexibility and regarded 
this as conceding an important trade union gain. but during collective bar-
gaining in 2002, management threatened to transfer production to the VW 
plant in bratislava (slovakia). When labor once again refused to make con-
cessions, management made good on its threat and transferred 10% of the 
Ibiza car production, the flagship model of the Martorell plant, to slovakia 
(Artiles 2002b). This was a shock for the unions, and the production of the 
Ibiza returned to spain only two years later, after unions agreed to more 
working-time flexibility.
During the next downturn of the european car market, labor in ger-
many was also under pressure to secure sufficient car production. In 2004, 
Ig Metall agreed to a lower-tier collective bargaining agreement, which 
applied to all newly employed workers. similar to the “5000 × 5000 project,” 
all newly employed workers earned about 20% less than the core workforce. 
In return for these concessions, labor secured production assignments to 
german assembly and parts plants (Ig Metall 2004).
In 2005, management pitted plants more directly against each other. The 
VW brand had hired Wolfgang bernhard as a new CeO. As president of 
Chrysler in the United states, he had overseen its restructuring as part of 
DaimlerChrysler. bernhard announced that the production of the Tiguan 
would go to either hannover (germany) or setubal (Portugal). Production 
was allocated to the german plant after the works council agreed to conces-
sions. bernhard also initiated the first competition between two german 
assembly plants. The production of the C-Coupe was offered to both the 
emden and Mosel plants and was won by the former (works council inter-
view, germany, December 8, 2005, germany, 2005).
These concessions are attributable to union consent rather than union 
weakness. Membership density was more than 95%, and unlike german 
companies covered by sectoral collective bargaining, labor had the right to 
strike at the company level. Labor representatives tolerated whipsawing 
because they shared management’s view of a highly competitive product 
market in which the survival of the company was at stake. Whipsawing made 
the plants more competitive and therefore helped to secure jobs (works 
council interview, germany, July 19, 2005).
VW management pursued a two-pronged strategy to convince labor. first, 
management cooperated closely with labor, not only through the german 
institutionalized channels of worker representation but also in the eWC 
and WWC. The VW management took the eWC and WWC meetings seri-
ously, with the CeO attending the meetings (a practice rarely seen in other 
eWCs). here, management presented company information, including 
benchmarking data, to labor representatives, with an aim of convincing 
labor of the need to increase productivity and stay competitive (works 
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council interview, germany, December 16, 2005; management interview, 
spain, March 16, 2006; union interview, spain, March 23, 2006).
The second element of management’s ideological work was the excessive 
compensation of labor representatives, which was partly illegal. In 2005, it 
became public that VW had paid extremely high salaries to key labor repre-
sentatives. The chairman of the WWC, eWC, and german works council, 
Klaus Volkert, had received an annual income of €350,000 and bonuses 
worth more than €2 million between 1995 and 2005 (hartz and Kloepfer 
2007). In addition, an assistant human-relations manager had organized 
brothel visits for labor representatives in the context of eWC and WWC 
meetings and had flown prostitutes from brazil to germany for Volkert. 
After the revelation, plant-level labor representatives expressed in interviews 
that this special treatment explained some of Volkert’s concessions to man-
agement and his acceptance of bidding contests between suppliers (union 
interview 2006; works council interviews 2005). Although this suggests that 
Volkert had been bribed, the bribery charge was not upheld in a german 
court; however, he and the highest human-relations manager were con-
victed of embezzlement.
Volkert’s successor was more critical of management practices, as can be 
seen in a 2006 WWC communiqué criticizing whipsawing practices and 
reminding management of its obligations to workers (Volkswagen 2006). 
nevertheless, whipsawing persisted. for example, in 2007, VW offered the 
spanish unions the berlina model, and after labor agreed to concessions, 
management assigned the car’s production to the seAT Martorell plant. 
Thus management’s effort to reinforce the labor-management partnership 
by influencing workers’ ideas survived the scandal and the resulting turn-
over in the works council leadership.
Comparative Assessment
We have described the variation and change in our sample over three 
decades, examining whipsawing practice and two explanatory factors: whip-
sawing capacity (see Table 2) and management’s labor relations strategy. 
Table 3 presents a comparison of the cases during this period using these 
variables, disaggregated by whipsawing episode.
As we can see, neither factor is sufficient to explain the variation or 
change in whipsawing practices. for example, we observe informal whipsaw-
ing under conditions of medium whipsawing capacity (i.e., when manage-
ment’s ability to follow through on its relocation threats was not always 
certain) at gM during the late 1980s and early 1990s and at ford through-
out the 1990s. Against a backdrop of high whipsawing capacity (i.e., when 
management clearly could follow through on relocation threats) since the 
mid-1990s, we observe varying and changing whipsawing patterns. gM 
switched from coercive to rule-based whipsawing, and VW switched from 
informal to coercive to hegemonic whipsawing. furthermore, the dominant 
pattern at ford after the 1980s remained informal whipsawing, despite an 
increase in whipsawing capacity.
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Whipsawing capacity, however, is an important enabling factor. We do not 
observe it at VW during the 1980s or at gM prior to 1986, when production 
was idiosyncratic, not interchangeable across the multinational production 
network, and when the market was not yet saturated. Only when the whip-
sawing capacity is medium to high do we observe whipsawing at all, and 
increases in whipsawing capacity enables greater sophistication. We observe 
informal and coercive whipsawing when the whipsawing capacity is high or 
medium (for all three companies after the early 1990s), but we witness hege-
monic or rule-based whipsawing only when the whipsawing capacity is high 
(for gM and VW after 2004, and for VW parts plants after 1999).
Labor relations strategies also help to explain why, despite the overall 
increase in whipsawing capacity, whipsawing practice continued to vary. At 
VW, hegemonic whipsawing became dominant after a period of coercive 
whipsawing. Management engaged in ideological work and spent consider-
able effort to align the interests of the social partners by organizing coopera-
tion forums at the local, national, and transnational levels (eWC and WWC). 
At ford, management sought to protect its partnership with labor, on which 
its transition to lean production was premised, by switching in the 1990s 
from coercive to informal whipsawing. nevertheless, ford management did 
use coercive whipsawing when faced with local strikes. gM management dur-
ing the 1990s was less concerned with its relationship with labor than with 
reducing costs through the extraction of labor concessions using coercive 
whipsawing. When this caused strikes, after 2003 management tried to 
increase the legitimacy of whipsawing through a formal bidding process.
further factors have also influenced whipsawing practices. In some cases, 
union behavior mattered; for example, gM management introduced rule-
based whipsawing following a transnational labor protest, and ford 
responded to local strike action in spain by using coercive whipsawing prac-
tices. In most of the whipsawing episodes, however, union behavior did not 
have a significant impact on management whipsawing. In addition, the vary-
ing exposure to financial markets mattered in some whipsawing episodes. 
for example, gM faced a shareholder revolt in the early 1990s, which could 
explain its switch to more aggressive whipsawing; also, the more muted 
whipsawing practices at VW during that period might be related to its rela-
tive insulation from financial markets. but degree of exposure to financial 
markets does not explain the changes in whipsawing practices at gM and 
VW in the late 1990s and 2000s, when exposure to financial markets did not 
change significantly for these companies.
Conclusion
Although economic globalization increased competitive pressures similarly in 
all three companies, each company’s management developed varying whip-
sawing practices in response. In this article, we have explored the emergence 
of, and differences among, whipsawing patterns in relation to different whip-
sawing capacities and management’s different labor relations strategies.
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The various forms of whipsawing are important for employment relations 
research because they are important management tools for engineering 
change in employment relations, spreading work practices through global 
corporate networks, and loosening constraints associated with national insti-
tutions. for example, management in the auto industry was able to push 
through alien concepts such as multi-tier wage structures in germany and 
working-time flexibility in spain and to implement the principles and norms 
of global manufacturing systems across borders.
The extent of whipsawing in other sectors and world regions remains an 
open question. Taken separately, the practices we have discussed—the inter-
national integration and standardization of production, underpinned by 
benchmarking, capital mobility, and the search for labor concessions—are 
far from unique to the european auto sector. The same is true of the prob-
lems of saturated markets and production overcapacities. future research 
examining how and why market competition is staged differently in other 
contexts could therefore uncover additional patterns of whipsawing.
how will management whipsawing in the auto industry develop in the 
future? One possibility is that automakers might become content with wages, 
social benefits, and working conditions once they reach a low level and then 
institutionalize them using multiemployer bargaining. This would provide 
stability and protect firms from union whipsawing in the event of an increase 
in workers’ collective power. Alternatively, and this seems more likely, man-
agement could develop whipsawing on a global scale. During the period of 
our study, international whipsawing took place on the scale of the world 
region (e.g., europe or north America), and the relocation of production 
between continents was constrained by varying quality standards, trade bar-
riers, and transportation costs. This is changing, however, because of the 
continuing global integration of markets and production platforms. Under 
these conditions, management could pit plants in south America and Asia 
against those in north America and europe in global contests for produc-
tion and investment.
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